The Dual Chokepoint Trap: Houthis Threaten to Seal Bab el-Mandeb as Hormuz Stays Closed

Saudi Arabia's Red Sea oil lifeline is one Houthi escalation away from collapse. If both straits close simultaneously, the global energy system enters uncharted territory.

An oil tanker transits open water. Since Iran sealed the Strait of Hormuz in early March, tanker traffic has been rerouted through the Red Sea - now itself under threat. (Pexels)

The math is simple and the numbers are catastrophic. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz has already severed roughly 15 million barrels per day of crude oil from the global market. Saudi Arabia responded by diverting nearly five million barrels per day through its Red Sea port of Yanbu, threading tankers south through the Bab el-Mandeb strait between Yemen and Djibouti. That diversion has kept global oil prices from breaching $120 a barrel. It has kept European refineries running on fumes instead of shutting down entirely. It is the last functioning artery in a bleeding energy system.

And the Houthis are considering cutting it.

On April 1, 2026 - Day 33 of Operation Epic Fury - Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi movement launched its third coordinated missile strike against Israel, in concert with Iran and Hezbollah. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree announced the attack in a video statement, describing it as a joint operation targeting "sensitive Israeli enemy targets" with ballistic missiles. The strikes hit southern Israel near Eilat. The Israeli military confirmed interceptions but reported at least 14 injuries from separate Iranian missile volleys the same day, according to Israel's emergency medical service Magen David Adom (AP News).

But the missiles aimed at Israel are not the main threat. The main threat is what comes next. Bloomberg News reported on March 30 that Iran has been pressing Houthi leaders "to prepare for a renewed campaign against Red Sea shipping, contingent upon any further escalation by the US," citing European officials familiar with the matter. Houthi deputy information minister Mohammed Mansour confirmed the group has joined the war "to provide support to our brothers in Iran who are fighting epic battles," and stated they are in "joint coordination with our brothers in Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq." The Houthis have not ruled out closing Bab el-Mandeb. Their leadership described the option as "likely," according to The War Zone.

If they do, the sum of all fears becomes reality: both of the world's most critical oil chokepoints shut down simultaneously.

The Geometry of Global Oil

Global oil infrastructure operates on thin margins. One blocked strait is a crisis. Two is a catastrophe. (Pexels)

To understand why the dual chokepoint scenario terrifies energy analysts, you need to understand the geography. The Strait of Hormuz, a 33-kilometer-wide channel between Iran and Oman, carries roughly 20% of the world's total oil consumption on any given day. Before the war, approximately 17-21 million barrels per day transited Hormuz - crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Iran itself. When Iran's IRGC Navy began interdicting commercial traffic in early March, that flow stopped. Insurance premiums for Hormuz transit skyrocketed past warzone levels. Lloyd's of London classified the entire Persian Gulf as an active conflict zone. Tankers that tried to run the gauntlet were either boarded, fired upon, or turned back.

Saudi Arabia, the world's largest crude exporter, had a contingency. The East-West Pipeline - originally built during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s for precisely this scenario - connects Saudi oil fields in the Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, on the kingdom's western coast. Riyadh activated the pipeline at maximum capacity, pushing close to five million barrels per day westward. Those barrels then load onto tankers at Yanbu, sail south through the Red Sea, pass through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, enter the Gulf of Aden, round the Horn of Africa, and reach Asian buyers the long way around.

The Vortexa shipping data firm confirmed the scale of the shift. Over the first 28 days of March, crude oil transiting Bab el-Mandeb jumped 21% compared to February, according to data cited by CNN. That figure understates the acceleration in the final week of March, when Saudi diversions hit peak throughput. Satellite tracking data from TankerTrackers.com showed convoys of VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) queuing at Yanbu in numbers not seen since the facility was built.

This is the lifeline. Five million barrels a day is not 15 million - it does not replace what Hormuz carried. But it is enough to prevent a full-blown energy collapse. European natural gas reserves, depleted by the loss of Qatari LNG shipments that also transited Hormuz, have been supplemented by emergency U.S. LNG cargoes. Japan and South Korea have activated strategic petroleum reserves. India has negotiated emergency Russian crude deliveries via the Cape of Good Hope route. The global energy system is barely functioning, held together by Saudi Yanbu exports and extraordinary diplomatic improvisation.

Bab el-Mandeb is where all of that improvisation passes through. The strait is 26 kilometers wide. Yemen's coastline dominates the eastern shore. The Houthis control most of it. They proved during their 15-month shipping campaign in 2023-2024 that they can hit vessels with anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and explosive-laden drone boats with enough regularity to make commercial transit economically unviable. They forced the world's largest shipping companies - Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd - to abandon the Red Sea route entirely, adding 10-14 days and hundreds of thousands of dollars per voyage to alternative routes around the Cape of Good Hope.

They can do it again. And this time, the stakes are orders of magnitude higher.

The Houthi Arsenal: What They Have and How They Use It

Anti-ship missile systems and surveillance capabilities give the Houthis asymmetric control over Red Sea shipping lanes. (Pexels)

The Houthi military has spent a decade accumulating Iranian-supplied weapons systems specifically designed for maritime interdiction. During the 2023-2024 Red Sea campaign, they demonstrated operational proficiency with multiple platforms. These included Iranian-designed anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) based on the Khalij Fars family, which use terminal guidance to strike moving vessels at ranges exceeding 300 kilometers. They deployed Quds-series land-attack cruise missiles modified for maritime targeting. They launched Samad-series long-range attack drones capable of carrying warheads up to 45 kilograms across distances of 1,500 kilometers. And they used explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels - essentially suicide drone boats - to attack ships in the strait itself.

The 2023-2024 campaign was devastating enough that the United States created Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023 to escort commercial shipping. That operation, along with the European Union's Operation Aspides, intercepted hundreds of Houthi projectiles over 15 months. But they could not prevent all attacks. The Houthis struck over 100 commercial vessels. They sank at least two cargo ships. They killed four crew members. And they fundamentally altered global shipping patterns, rerouting an estimated $1 trillion in annual trade away from the Suez Canal.

Since the ceasefire that ended the previous Houthi campaign, the group has not been idle. European intelligence officials told Bloomberg that Iran has been resupplying the Houthis with advanced munitions, including newer variants of anti-ship missiles with improved guidance systems. The Houthis have also reportedly received additional stocks of Iranian ballistic missiles - the same type they have been firing at Israel since March 28. A U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told The War Zone that the Houthis' current missile inventory is estimated at "hundreds of systems across multiple categories," making them arguably the most heavily armed non-state actor in the world.

Operation Aspides remains active in the Red Sea. An Aspides official told The War Zone on April 1 that the task force "maintains a high level of situational awareness and conducts daily assessments of potential risks to freedom of navigation." The official acknowledged that "a resumption of Houthi attacks to merchant vessels remains a possibility" and stated that Aspides is "present and ready to implement our mandate." The U.S. Navy's Destroyer Squadron 50, which absorbed the Prosperity Guardian mission, declined to comment on preparations for a potential Houthi escalation, according to The War Zone.

The gap between "ready to implement our mandate" and "capable of keeping the strait open under sustained bombardment" is significant. During the previous campaign, even with a combined U.S.-European naval presence, the Houthis fired enough missiles and drones to overwhelm defensive coverage. Ship-based interceptor missiles - SM-2s, SM-6s, ESSMs - cost between $1.5 million and $4.5 million per round. Houthi drones cost a few thousand dollars each. The economics of defense versus attack favor the Houthis at unsustainable ratios.

Operation Aspides vs. the Houthi Calculus

European naval vessels in formation. Operation Aspides patrols the Red Sea, but its capacity to absorb a renewed Houthi campaign while U.S. forces are committed to Iran remains an open question. (Pexels)

The military calculus has shifted dramatically since the last Houthi campaign. During 2023-2024, the United States had two carrier strike groups in the region, plus multiple destroyers and cruisers dedicated to Red Sea defense. Today, the vast majority of U.S. naval assets are committed to Operation Epic Fury in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, damaged during combat operations off Crete in late March, is undergoing repairs. The USS Harry S. Truman strike group is positioned in the Gulf of Oman, focused on Iran. The USS Nimitz is operating in the eastern Mediterranean in support of the Lebanon front.

What remains for Red Sea security is Operation Aspides - a European force built around a handful of frigates and destroyers from France, Italy, Germany, and Greece - plus whatever DESRON 50 assets CENTCOM can spare from the Iran campaign. This is a fraction of the force that struggled to contain the Houthis last time. European defense officials have privately expressed alarm, according to multiple media reports. One EU diplomat, speaking to European media on background, described the situation as "the worst possible scenario unfolding in slow motion."

The Houthis understand this asymmetry. Their decision-making is driven by a combination of ideological solidarity with Iran, strategic calculation about when maximum pressure produces maximum effect, and internal leadership dynamics that sometimes diverge from Tehran's directives. Analysts who track the group caution that while Iran can urge the Houthis to escalate, the group operates with significant autonomy. Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the movement's leader, has shown a pattern of calibrating attacks based on his own assessment of the political landscape rather than following Iranian instructions verbatim.

The question is not whether the Houthis can close Bab el-Mandeb. They demonstrated that capability conclusively in 2024. The question is whether they decide to do it now, when the consequences would be far more severe than last time. During 2023-2024, the Suez Canal route was the primary victim - trade was rerouted but continued. This time, the Bab el-Mandeb blockade would sever the only remaining oil lifeline from the Arabian Peninsula. There is no Plan C. There is no alternative pipeline from Saudi Arabia that bypasses both Hormuz and the Red Sea. If both straits close, approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil becomes inaccessible through any Middle Eastern route.

Trump's Speech and the Escalation Paradox

The White House, where Trump delivered his first national address on the Iran war on April 1, promising more aggressive strikes in the coming weeks. (Pexels)

President Trump's primetime national address on the evening of April 1 - his first formal speech on the Iran war - did nothing to calm the situation. In fact, it may have made the Houthi decision easier. Trump told the nation that "core strategic objectives are nearing completion" and that the U.S. military would "hit them extremely hard over the next two to three weeks." He said the war would end "shortly, very shortly." He said Iran's navy is "gone," its air force is "in ruins," and its missile capability is "dramatically curtailed," according to the full transcript published by AP News.

He also vowed to bomb Iran "back to the Stone Ages" if the regime did not capitulate. He mentioned the Strait of Hormuz only in the context of demanding Iran reopen it as a precondition for ceasefire talks. He made no reference to the Houthi threat in the Red Sea. He made no announcement of additional naval deployments to protect Bab el-Mandeb. He did not address the energy crisis beyond promising that gas prices would "come tumbling down" once operations concluded.

Markets reacted immediately and negatively. Brent crude, which had briefly dipped below $102 per barrel on hopes that Trump's speech would signal de-escalation, surged back above $107 by Thursday morning Asian trading hours. Japan's Nikkei 225 fell 2.1%. South Korea's KOSPI dropped 3.9%. Hong Kong's Hang Seng declined 1%, according to CNN. The promised de-escalation did not materialize. Instead, Trump's commitment to intensified strikes over "the next two to three weeks" signaled that the war - and the Hormuz closure - would continue well into mid-April at minimum.

For the Houthis, Trump's speech reinforced the logic of escalation. If the U.S. is going to "hit extremely hard" for two to three more weeks, Iran's proxy network has every incentive to maximize pressure during that same window. Closing Bab el-Mandeb would create economic pain so severe that it could force a ceasefire faster than any battlefield outcome. Oil at $150 or $200 per barrel - the range analysts predict if both straits close - would produce political consequences in Washington that no military victory in Iran could offset.

This is the escalation paradox at the heart of the dual chokepoint scenario. Every time the U.S. intensifies military operations against Iran, Iran's incentive to activate its proxy network increases. The more damage Operation Epic Fury inflicts on Iranian military infrastructure, the more Tehran relies on asymmetric tools - Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, militia groups in Iraq - to impose costs that America's conventional military cannot address with airstrikes.

The Oil Price Nightmare: Modeling the Dual Closure

Financial markets have already priced in a Hormuz closure. A simultaneous Bab el-Mandeb blockade would trigger price discovery in uncharted territory. (Pexels)

Energy economists have modeled the dual chokepoint scenario for decades. It has always been treated as a theoretical worst case - a "black swan" event with catastrophic but improbable consequences. As of April 2, 2026, it is no longer theoretical.

Current oil prices reflect a market that has absorbed the Hormuz closure but priced in Saudi Arabia's Yanbu workaround. Brent crude at $107 per barrel represents a market that believes approximately 5 million barrels per day of Saudi exports will continue to flow through the Red Sea, supplemented by U.S. shale production (currently at record highs of 13.8 million barrels per day), strategic reserve releases from Japan, South Korea, and EU member states, and emergency Russian crude deliveries to Asian buyers via longer routes.

If Bab el-Mandeb closes, the supply picture collapses. The 5 million barrels per day flowing through Yanbu would be stranded - tankers could still load at the port, but they would have to transit around the entire African continent to reach Asian markets, adding 25-30 days to voyage times and dramatically reducing effective throughput. Analysts at Rystad Energy estimated in a March 31 research note that simultaneous closure of both straits would remove approximately 18-20 million barrels per day from accessible global supply within two weeks, as tankers already at sea deliver their cargoes but no replacements arrive on schedule.

The International Energy Agency's emergency coordination mechanism, designed for exactly this scenario, allows member states to release strategic petroleum reserves in a coordinated fashion. But strategic reserves are finite. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, drawn down significantly during the 2022 energy crisis, currently holds approximately 370 million barrels - enough to replace about 2 million barrels per day for roughly six months. Japan holds approximately 470 million barrels in government and private reserves combined. South Korea holds about 96 million barrels. The EU's 90-day minimum stock requirement translates to approximately 1.1 billion barrels across all member states, though much of this is held by private companies and cannot be released immediately.

Even with full strategic reserve deployment, the gap between supply and demand would be enormous. Global oil consumption runs approximately 103 million barrels per day. Removing 20 million barrels from accessible supply - even temporarily - would produce price spikes that make the 1973 oil crisis look mild. Goldman Sachs, in a research note published March 28, estimated Brent crude could reach $150-180 per barrel within two weeks of a dual closure and potentially exceed $200 if the blockade persisted beyond a month. JP Morgan's energy team modeled a scenario showing gasoline prices in the United States exceeding $7 per gallon within 30 days of dual closure, with European diesel prices roughly tripling from current levels.

The cascading economic effects extend far beyond fuel costs. Modern supply chains depend on predictable energy inputs. Airlines would ground flights. Shipping costs for all goods - not just oil - would spike as marine fuel prices surge. Chemical manufacturers, which use petroleum feedstocks, would halt production. Agricultural costs would rise sharply as fertilizer and diesel prices escalate. The International Monetary Fund's contingency modeling, leaked to the Financial Times in late March, estimated that a dual chokepoint closure lasting 60 days would reduce global GDP growth by 1.5-2.0 percentage points in 2026 - enough to push multiple major economies into recession.

The Diplomatic Scramble: 35 Nations Without America

Diplomatic efforts to reopen Hormuz have accelerated since Trump's speech, with Britain leading a multinational initiative. (Pexels)

The diplomatic response to the chokepoint crisis has been extraordinary in both its urgency and its notable exclusion of the United States. On April 2, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced plans for an emergency meeting of nations to assess "diplomatic and political ways to make the Strait of Hormuz accessible and safe" after fighting ends, according to Reuters. This follows a 35-nation summit convened without American participation in late March, where countries dependent on Gulf oil exports attempted to negotiate a humanitarian corridor through Hormuz.

The core problem is that the United States does not share the same vulnerability. As Trump himself stated in his address: "We're now totally independent of the Middle East... We don't need their oil. We don't need anything they have. But we're there to help our allies." This statement, while domestically popular, horrified the 35 nations scrambling to keep their economies functioning. Trump's follow-up comment - telling allies to "go get your own oil" and "take the lead" on Hormuz - reinforced the perception that Washington views energy security as Europe and Asia's problem to solve.

Iran, meanwhile, has been conducting its own diplomatic maneuvers around the Hormuz issue. On April 2, Iranian state news agency IRNA reported that Iran and Oman are drafting a joint protocol to monitor passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated that ship traffic through the strait "should be monitored and coordinated with both countries," according to Haaretz. This amounts to Iran asserting sovereign control over Hormuz transit - a position that could persist even after hostilities end, fundamentally altering the legal framework governing the strait.

China has emerged as a key player in the energy crisis, though not in the way Washington might prefer. Beijing has refused Trump's request to contribute warships to a Hormuz escort coalition. Instead, China has been negotiating directly with Iran for preferential access to Iranian crude - bypassing the sanctions regime entirely. India has taken a similar approach, cutting deals with Russia for crude delivered via the Cape of Good Hope at discounted prices. The fracturing of the Western-led sanctions consensus is one of the war's most significant geopolitical consequences, and it is accelerating as the chokepoint crisis deepens.

The Bab el-Mandeb adds another layer of diplomatic complexity. Yemen's recognized government, based in Aden, has no control over the Houthi-held territories along the strait. Saudi Arabia, which fought a brutal war against the Houthis from 2015 to 2022, achieved a fragile truce only through significant concessions. Riyadh has no leverage over Houthi decision-making. The UN Security Council, paralyzed by Russian and Chinese vetoes on Iran-related resolutions, has been unable to pass binding measures addressing maritime security in either strait.

The Lebanon Front: Israel's Expanding War

Damage from Israeli strikes in Lebanon. The ground invasion has displaced over one million people and drawn European condemnation. (Pexels)

The Houthi threat does not exist in isolation. It is one front in a multi-theater war that has expanded far beyond what U.S. planners anticipated when Operation Epic Fury launched on February 28. The Lebanon front, in particular, has become a significant drain on regional military resources and diplomatic bandwidth.

Israel's ground invasion of southern Lebanon, which began in mid-March under the stated objective of creating a "buffer zone" against Hezbollah rocket fire, has expanded dramatically. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instructed the IDF earlier this week to further widen the invasion to "fundamentally change the situation in the north," according to Al Jazeera. Israel has deployed at least five divisions into southern Lebanon. Far-right ministers in Netanyahu's coalition have urged outright annexation of the territory. The IDF has been destroying villages and bridges to establish what it calls a security corridor, cutting southern Lebanon off from the rest of the country.

On April 1, an Israeli airstrike on Beirut's Mediterranean coast killed at least seven people, including a senior Hezbollah commander responsible for southern Lebanese operations, according to NPR. More than 1,300 people in Lebanon have been killed in approximately four weeks of Israeli attacks. Over one million have been displaced. UNIFIL peacekeepers have come under fire from Israeli forces on multiple occasions - an escalation that the UN's Stephane Dujarric warned "may constitute war crimes under international law," as cited by Havana Times.

Ten European countries plus the EU's foreign policy chief issued a joint statement on April 1 condemning Hezbollah's attacks on Israel while simultaneously urging Israel to halt its ground invasion. "We strongly reaffirm that the territorial integrity of Lebanon must be respected," the statement read, according to NPR. The statement reflects a European position increasingly at odds with Washington, which has offered no criticism of Israel's Lebanon operations.

The Lebanon war matters for the chokepoint crisis because it further stretches the resources of the anti-Iran coalition, diverts naval and air assets from potential Red Sea deployment, and intensifies Hezbollah's motivation to escalate - including coordination with the Houthis. The joint missile strikes on April 1, conducted simultaneously by Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis against Israeli targets, represent the most coordinated multi-front attack by the "Axis of Resistance" since the war began. If this coordination extends to maritime operations, the Red Sea becomes a joint battlespace rather than a Houthi solo operation.

Russia's Quiet Advance: Luhansk Falls as the World Looks Away

The Iran war has consumed global attention while Russia continues grinding advances in eastern Ukraine. (Pexels)

While the world focuses on the Middle East, another war grinds forward. On April 1, Russia's Defense Ministry claimed its forces had taken complete control of Ukraine's Luhansk region - one of four territories Moscow illegally annexed in September 2022 but never fully occupied. "Units of the Group of Forces West have completed the liberation of the Luhansk People's Republic," the ministry stated, according to AP News.

Ukraine denied the claim. Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for Ukraine's Joint Forces grouping, told AP by phone: "Unfortunately, we only hold small patches there, but those positions have been held by 3rd brigade for a long time." The Moscow Times noted this is the third time Russia has claimed full control of Luhansk since the 2022 invasion, suggesting the announcements are calibrated for diplomatic leverage rather than reflecting clean territorial lines.

The timing is significant. Zelenskyy was preparing for a video call with U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to discuss further peace negotiations. Russia's Luhansk claim serves as a pressure tool - suggesting that Ukraine's position is deteriorating and that Kyiv should accept territorial concessions before losing more ground. Ukrainian officials have accused Moscow of making false battlefield claims specifically to influence American negotiators, according to AP.

The broader pattern is clear: Russia is exploiting the Iran war to advance in Ukraine while Western attention and military resources are directed elsewhere. Ukraine's air force reported downing 298 drones overnight on April 1-2, mostly Iranian-designed Shaheds and cheaper variants, while 20 drones struck targets across 11 sites nationwide. A Russian drone strike killed four people in Cherkasy region. In western Ukraine, near the Polish border, drones damaged industrial facilities in Lutsk, 400 kilometers west of Kyiv.

Ukraine has responded by positioning itself as a security partner for Gulf states. Zelenskyy stated on April 2 that Ukraine is "engaged in substantive cooperation" with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, offering drone defense expertise honed through years of fighting Russian aerial attacks. This is a remarkable diplomatic pivot - Ukraine leveraging its battlefield experience with Iranian-designed drones to build relationships with the very Gulf monarchies that need protection from those same weapons.

Timeline: 33 Days of Escalation

What Happens Next

The next 72 hours will determine whether the Houthis escalate from missile strikes on Israel to a full Red Sea shipping blockade. (Pexels)

The next two to three weeks - the window Trump himself defined for intensified operations - will determine whether the Houthi threat materializes. Three scenarios are in play.

Scenario 1: Houthis limit attacks to Israel. The Houthis continue launching ballistic missiles at Israeli targets, coordinating with Iran and Hezbollah, but do not target commercial shipping in the Red Sea or threaten Bab el-Mandeb. This is the best-case outcome. Oil prices remain elevated but stable. The global economy absorbs the Hormuz closure through Saudi Yanbu diversions and strategic reserve releases. Probability: declining. The Houthis have escalated at each stage of the war, and Bloomberg's reporting suggests Iran is actively pushing for a maritime campaign.

Scenario 2: Selective Houthi attacks on shipping. The Houthis resume targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea but do not attempt a full blockade of Bab el-Mandeb. Shipping companies activate emergency protocols. Insurance premiums spike. Some tankers reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to delivery times. Oil prices jump to $120-130 range. Economic damage is severe but manageable with coordinated international response. Probability: moderate. This is the Houthis' proven playbook from 2023-2024, scaled up.

Scenario 3: Full dual chokepoint closure. The Houthis, in coordination with Iran, declare Bab el-Mandeb closed to shipping and launch sustained attacks on any vessel attempting transit. Saudi Yanbu exports become undeliverable. Combined with the Hormuz closure, approximately 20 million barrels per day are cut off. Oil prices exceed $150 and potentially approach $200. Global recession begins within weeks. Emergency summits. Potential for direct U.S. military engagement against the Houthis, opening yet another front in an already overextended campaign. Probability: low but rising. The Houthis have the capability. Iran has the motivation. And Trump's speech just removed the last diplomatic off-ramp.

There are no good options. The war that was supposed to last weeks has entered its second month with no ceasefire in sight. Iran's military infrastructure is being degraded, exactly as Trump described. But Iran's asymmetric capabilities - the proxy network, the chokepoint leverage, the ability to impose economic pain through non-military means - remain intact. Every airstrike on Tehran makes Bab el-Mandeb more dangerous.

The tankers are still moving through the Red Sea tonight. Saudi crude is still flowing from Yanbu. The Houthis have not yet pulled the trigger on a full maritime campaign. But the weapons are loaded, the targets are mapped, and the order from Tehran could come at any moment. The dual chokepoint trap is set. The only question is whether anyone walks into it.