The injected script URL (1688360.cc) appeared in the Optimizely snippet of dozens of high‑profile sites.
*On 16 November 2026 malicious JavaScript ran on 178 high‑traffic organisations via Optimizely’s Web experimentation platform. The payload swapped crypto wallets, skimmed cards and deployed iOS exploit kits, stealing verified funds before most code was removed.*
On 16 November 2026, a malicious JavaScript snippet was delivered through Optimizely to visitors of 178 organisations, among them Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France‑KLM, Ledger and Peacock. The code lived inside the optional Project JavaScript field of each customer’s Optimizely snippet, a piece of script that browsers fetch from cdn.optimizely.com under Optimizely’s TLS certificate. Because the snippet appeared to come from a trusted domain, the attack bypassed traditional perimeter defenses and infected millions of page views in a single day. The payload, identified as track.js, performed crypto‑address swapping, card‑skimming and iOS exploit delivery, with verified cryptocurrency transactions already traced to the attackers. By the evening, most malicious code had been scrubbed, but a single snippet remained active on TalkTalk’s site.
Optimizely serves a JavaScript snippet from its CDN for every customer. The snippet contains the platform’s core code and an optional Project JavaScript (projectJS) field where customers can add custom scripts. The attacker wrote malicious code into the projectJS of dozens of unrelated customer projects. The resulting snippet was still delivered from cdn.optimizely.com with a valid Optimizely certificate, so browsers treated it as trusted. No CDN cache‑poisoning occurred; the CDN simply served the attacker‑supplied script. Because the injection lived inside a legitimate customer‑controlled field, traditional CDN‑based defenses saw no anomaly, allowing the malicious track.js loader to run on every page that loaded the snippet.
The track.js payload was a multi‑purpose kit. First, it scanned pages for any valid cryptocurrency address—BTC, ETH, EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin—and replaced it with an attacker‑controlled address, validating checksums before swapping. It altered text, form fields, links, images, clipboard data, fetch/XHR requests, window.open calls and the iOS share sheet, re‑scanning the page after each change. Second, a card‑skimmer added at 13:43 UTC watched all form submissions and POST requests for Luhn‑checked card numbers and expiry data, exfiltrating them. Third, on iPhones and iPads the payload injected Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits via hidden iframes, targeting devices running iOS 18.6 or earlier. The script also stole cookies, screenshots and other session data, creating a broad attack surface from a single injected file.
The compromised list spans media, finance, travel and technology. Notable victims include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France‑KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely’s own domains—www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com—also carried the malicious code. In addition, customers who hosted the snippet on their own domains, such as opt.scheels.com and www.vodafone.com.au, were infected because the content originated from the same Optimizely project. By 21:52 UTC only one of 188 infected snippets remained, identified on TalkTalk, after a mass clean‑up that removed the code from Ledger, Smartsheet and the BBC earlier that evening.
Security teams scrubbed the malicious projectJS from affected snippets throughout the day, rebuilding the payload 26 times before finally removing it. By 20:56 UTC 169 of 188 infected snippets were cleared; by 21:52 UTC only one remained. Organizations that rely on Optimizely were urged to implement strict Content Security Policies in enforcement mode, which could block unknown script sources like 1688360.cc. Report URI’s detection platform flagged unexpected script changes and suspicious outbound connections, demonstrating that CSP and runtime monitoring can stop similar supply‑chain attacks. However, the root cause—how the attacker gained write access to multiple Optimizely projects—remains unexplained, leaving the platform’s internal controls under scrutiny.
Yes. The malicious script swapped valid wallet addresses with attacker‑controlled ones, and verified transactions to the attackers have already been observed.
The attacker wrote code into the Project JavaScript field of customer projects, which the CDN served unchanged from cdn.optimizely.com; the exact method of gaining write access has not been disclosed.
A CSP in enforcement mode could block unknown script sources like 1688360.cc, limiting the payload’s ability to load and execute, as highlighted by the report.
The Optimizely breach proves that a single compromised third‑party service can weaponize the supply chain of the world’s most visited sites. Until Optimizely clarifies how write access was obtained, organisations must treat every external script as a potential attack vector, enforce CSP, and monitor runtime changes. The lesson is clear: trust must be verified, not assumed.
Sources: Hacker News – Report URI blog post "World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely"